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The Classical Roots of Neo-classical Political Economy 
            
  Neoclassical Political Economy applies the concepts and techniques of  Neoclassical 
Analysis to elucidate the interrelations between the Economy, the Polity and the State. 
The basic issues at hand were clearly stated by the social thinkers of the 17th, 18th and 19th 
Centuries., often referred to (admiringly or disparagingly) as the “Classics” 
 
 The “Classics”  lacked the analytic techniques of contemporary social science. They had 
no access to statistical data and had no knowledge of quantitative methods. They lived in a 
universe much simpler than ours. They often failed to distinguish between the normative and the 
positive approach. Yet despite such limitations (or perhaps because of them) they often had an 
extraordinary clarity of vision.  The insights of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, of Madison 













Thomas Hobbes: A supply and demand analysis of government provision of “Law and 
Order”1. 
Anticipating by almost three centuries the modern approach, Thomas Hobbes  (1588 - 
1679)  analyzed in terms of demand and supply why there is a need for the services of a 
Sovereign, and how the Sovereign fulfills that need..  
The Hobbesian system is  built  on the basis of fundamental assumptions concerning the 
Nature of Man.  All men, says Hobbes, "desire certain things...vertue generally in all sorts of 
subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things 
were equally in all men, nothing would be prized". From this it follows that man has a "perpetual 
and restless desire for power" which Hobbes defines as “the present means to obtain some future 
apparent good”. 
 
Since all people are endowed with similar abilities, there is no natural human hierarchy, 
and, as a consequence people struggle for power:  
“Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body and mind... [so that] when all is 
reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable as  that one man 
can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend as well as he... 
                                                 
1 We look at Hobbes, Locke  and Hume as precursors of neoclassical political economy; the brief 













From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if 
any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become 
enemies; and in way to their end (which is principally their own conservation...) endeavour to 
destroy or subdue one an other. ... So in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of 
quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly Glory. The first maketh men invade 
for Gain; the second for Safety; and the third for Reputation....during the time men live without a 
common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in a condition which is called Warre; and such 
a warre as is of every man against every man….the  nature of war consisteth not in actuall 
fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the 
contrary" (Hobbes, 1651, 1968, pp. 183 - 186)2 
 
 
Most men prefer peace, in the absence  Law and Order enforced by a Ruler, every one  
must take individual measures to defend himself against potential aggression. “Natural law” 
dictates that man should strive for self- preservation. From this follows “the First Rule of 
Reason” which says that if a man cannot obtain peace, “he may seek, and use, all helps, and 
advantages of Warre” (ibid. p. 190). 
 
Reason dictates that, to avoid the hardships  of self-defense, every individual should be 
willing to cede the role of defender to the ruler provided all other individuals do likewise. 
Hobbes’ “Second Law of Nature” is : “That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-
forth, as for Peace and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down his right to all 
                                                 













things; and be content with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men 
against himselfe" (ibid. p. 190).  Self-interest dictates the forfeiting of   individual good (self-
defense) to acquire a collective good (Law and Order provided by the Ruler). 
 
The sovereign is, by nature, no different from his subjects, and he too is motivated solely 
by self-interest. He therefore uses his monopoly power to enrich himself. But Sovereigns do not 
draw any “delight or profit” from “the damage or weakening of their Subjects” hence: 
"the greatest, that in any forme of government can possibly happen to people in generall, is 
scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a Civil Warre; 
or that dissolute condition of masterless men.” (Ibid. p. 238). 
 
 
 Empirical evidence supports  Hobbes’s assumption that the struggle for eminence is a 
motivational force.  As early as 1949 Duesenberry showed that an individual’s consumption 
behavior was conditioned by his standing within his reference group. At the time White and 
Black Americans were to a large extent socially separated. The “income pyramid” of Whites was 
much higher than that of the Blacks.  Duesenberry demonstrated that the relative position within 
each income pyramid was a better predictor of the savings behavior than the absolute income 













 Sociological studies also indicate that  an individual’s feeling of satisfaction with his 
living standard depends on the  relative position he occupies within his reference group. For 
instance, a 1991 British Household Panel Survey covering a random sample of some 10,000 
individuals in 5,000 households shows that: 
“Workers reported levels of well - being are at best weakly correlated with absolute income 
alone... measures of comparison income [the income of the peer group computed by regressing 
earnings on age, sex, education, and other characteristics] are significantly and negatively 
correlated with reported happiness at work” (Clark and Oswald, 1996 p. 360) 
 
Summing up the studies carried out in the 1960s and the in the early 1970s Kohn concludes that:  
 
“there is a consistent and meaningful relationship between people’s social-class position and 
their values and orientation;…  the class-values relationship has important implications for 
behavior; and…the class-values relationship, in turn, can be interpreted as resulting from 
systematic differences in conditions of life, occupational life in particular,  associated with 
social-class position”(Kohn, 1977 p.xxv) 
 
 Though  most neoclassical economists follow Adam Smith in assuming that consumers 
derive utility solely from their own consumption. (Blaug, 1992 p. 220)3,  some do recognize the 
importance of relative standing. A ”radically Hobbesian” view is upheld, among others, by 
Scitovsky: 
 
                                                 
3 Since Becker’s pioneering studies of “New Household Economics” the family, rather than the individual, is looked 












“though our economic welfare is forever rising… we are no happier as a result.. The puzzle is 
that rising rank on the income scale seems to improve one’s chances of happiness, but a rise in 
everybody’s income rising does not” (Scitovsky 1992,p. 135) 
 
 
 Paradoxically, the view that the absolute income level is not an argument of the utility 
function is inconsistent with Hobbes’s hypothesis that everybody’s life can be improved by the 
elimination of anarchy. For if, under the Leviathan, every one enjoys the same degree of 
“eminence” as he did under anarchy, no one benefits from having more income. If the relative 
degree of “eminence” changes, some individuals gain, while others loose.  
 
 For a Leviathan to be acceptable to all members of the Hobbesian polity, its members 
must derive satisfaction from their own consumption, as well as from the degree of “eminence” 
each of the enjoys. To shows this, let us express the ith individual’ s utility as: 
  ui = ui [αi ci  + ( 1 – αi ) (ci – cj)]        1.2a 
and  similarly for j: 
 uj = uj  [αj cj  + ( 1 – αj) (cj – ci)]       1.2b 
where   1≥α >0   is the relative weight individual i (individual j)  attaches to his own consumption 
and (1- α ) is the weight  he attaches to “eminence”. The payoffs to i and to j are shown in real 















                                                                 Player j 
(1)  (2) 
(1)   ci11,  cj11  ci12, cj12  
Player i 
(2)    ci 21, cj21  ci22, cj 22  
 
       Table. 1.1 
 
 . Let  ci 11> ci 21,  ci 12> ci 22 ,  cj11> cj 12, cj 12> cj 22,  ci 11> ci 22 and  cj 11> cj 22 . If  both i and j 
derive utility only from the payoff each of them gets (that is, if, in eq. 1.2  αi = αj = 1, so that  ui = 
ui( ci ) and  uj = uj( cj ) ) then (1,1) is the dominant strategy and individual optimization leads to a 
joint optimum. However, in the presence of “eminence”, this happy result might not pertain. For 
a sufficiently small  αi , for the ith individual it must be true that 
 ui [αi (ci 21)+ (1- αi)( ci 21 – cj21)] >  ui [αi (ci 11) + (1- αi)( ci 11- cj 11)] and also 
 ui [αi (ci 22)+ (1- αi)( ci 22 – cj22)] >  ui [αi (ci 12) + (1- αi)( ci 12- cj 12  )] 
which means that for the ith individual strategy 2 is dominant, and similarly for the jth 














 A numerical example may be helpful in clarifying the above. Let two players i and j face 
the following payoff matrix      
          
           Player j 
(1)  (2) 
(1)   10,10  4, 8  
Player i 
(2)      8, 4   2, 2 
  
      Table. 1.2 
 
Where the numbers represent quantities, such as thousands of dollars.  
 If each of the individual’s utility depended solely on the payoff accruing to him, then αi = 
αj =1 and  the numbers given in matrix 1.2 could be interpreted as indicating utilities.  Thus 
ui(1,1) = 10 , ui1,2 = 8 and so on. The dominant strategy is (1,1), leads to a Pareto - optimal 
outcome, with each of the players obtaining the highest attainable utility level. 
 Assume now that “eminence” matters, and let αi =3/5, and αj =3/5, meaning that each  
individual assigns a weight of 3/5 to his own payoff and of 2/5 to the difference between his 












 uA (2), while  uA(1,2)=[(3/5· 8) + 2/5( 8 – 4)] = 6.4, and so on.  The utility matrix corresponding 
to the physical payoffs indicated in  Table. 1.2 can be represented as: 
           Player j 
                                               (1)                        (2) 
                                  (1)      6.0,  6.0               0.8, 6.4 
Player i 
                                  (2)      6.4,  0.8                1.2, 1.2 
 
                                              Table.  1.3 
 
The dominant strategy is (2,2) leading to a Pareto-inferior position.4 Both players would be better 
off if a Ruler forced both of them to adopt strategy 1. In physical terms the total payoff of 
Strategy (1,1) is equal to 20 units, while that of Strategy (2,2) is equal to 4 units. As long, 
therefore, as the Ruler exacts from the players no more than 16 units, the players are better off 
than they would be under anarchy. 
  
 The State can be destroyed by envy. We shall say that i envies j if the  consumption of the 
latter affects negatively the utility of the former, as, for instance in the case in which ui = ui(αici - 
βicj)   where αi >0 and βi>0. If βi > αi  the ith individual is willing to impoverish himself in order 
to impoverish j. If the feeling is reciprocated by j, both prefer the horrors of war to peaceful co-
existence. To illustrate this statement take the case in 
                                                 












which αi = 2/5 and βi  = 3/5 (and likewise for j) Applying these coefficients to the payoff matrix 
shown in fig.1 we see that strategy (2,2) is Pareto-efficient: 
      Player j 
          (1) (2) 
           (1)     -5, -5      -5,  -1  
Player i 
(2)      -1, -5      -1, -1 
 
              Table. 1.4 
 
The imposition of Law and Order (i.e. the enforcement of strategy (1,1))  makes the society more 
prosperous, but the citizens are more unhappy than if they were permitted to enjoy mutual 
destruction. The armed intervention of NATO and of the UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosova,  
Sierra Leone  and elsewhere  reflects the belief that  the  suppression of “anarchy” improves the 
inhabitants’ well-being. But the imposition of Law and Order on individuals who attach greater 
weight to “eminence” than to their own consumption reduces their welfare. Some communities 
are, inherently non-viable, and a break up into separate entities might be the only viable solution. 
 
  John Locke (1632-1704)  Order vs. Liberty. 
 
 For  Locke men are, by nature, “all free, equal, and independent” (ch. VIII, § 95)5   
                                                 












“The State of Nature  has a Law of  Nature to govern it,  which obliges every one: and 
Reason, which is the Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and 
independent, no one ought to harm  another in his Life,  Health, Liberty, or Possessions”(ch.II, 
§6). 
Yet life in the State of Nature has certain  “inconveniences”: 
 
“First, There wants an established, settled, known Law, received and allowed by common 
consent to be the standard of Right and Wrong, and the common measure to decide all 
Controversies between them. For though the Law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all 
rational Creatures; yet men being biased by their Interest, as well as ignorant for  want of study 
of it, are not to allow of it as a Law binding to them in the application of  it to their particular 
Cases. 
 
Secondly , in the State of Nature there wants a known and indifferent Judge , with Authority  to 
determine all differences according to the established  Law For everyone in that state being both 
Judge and Executioner of the Law  of Nature, men being partial to themselves, Passion and 
revenge being apt to carry them too far, and too much heat in their own cases; as well as 
negligence and unconcernedness  to make them too remiss, in other Mens. 
 
Thirdly in the State of Nature there often wants Power to back and support the sentence when 
right,  and to give it due Execution. They who are by Injustice offended, will seldom fail, when  
they are able, by force to make good their Injustice: such resistance  many times makes 
resistance dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it”(ch. IX, §§124-127) 
 
There is a  “ plain difference between the State of Nature and the State of War… Men 
living together according to Reason, without  a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to 
judge between them, is properly the State of Nature. But force,  or a declared design of force 
upon the Person of another, where there is no common  Superior on Earth to appeal to for relief, 
is the State of War” (ch. III § 19) 
  
The “State of Nature” may, however, degenerate into a “State of War”: 
 
“…in the State of Nature every one has the Executive Power of the Law of Nature”…To this 
doctrine it may be objected  “that it is unreasonable for Men to be Judges in their own cases. 
That Self-love will make men partial to themselves and to their Friends. And on the other side, 














“To avoid  this State of War… is one great reason of  Mens  putting themselves into  
 
Society and  quitting the State of Nature” (ch. II  §21)  Hence, says Locke, “I easily grant that  
 





 Legitimate government is formed by consent: 
 
“The only way whereby anyone devests himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts on the bonds of 
Civil Society is by agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite into a Community, for their  
Properties, and a greater Security against any that are not of it. This any number of Men may do, 
comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their 
because it injures not the Freedom of the rest; they  are left as they were in the Liberty of the 
State of Nature. When any number of Men have so consented to make one Community or 
government, they are thereby presently incorporated , and make one Body Politick, wherein the 
Majority have the right to  act and conclude the rest”.(ch. VII, §95) 6 
 
 
Legitimacy requires that the same rules should apply to those who govern and to those  
 
who are governed. : “No Man in a Civil Society can be exempted from the Laws of it”(ch. VII, 
§94) A government which puts the ruler above the law has no legitimacy: 
 
“Absolute Monarchy … is indeed inconsistent with Civil Society and  so can be no form 
of Civil Government at all.  For the  end of Civil Society , being to avoid, and remedy those 
inconveniences  of the State of  Nature, which necessarily follow from Man’s being Judge in his 
                                                 
6 In paragraph 99 Locke clarifies that majority rule should prevail  unless the individuals who formed the 












own Case, by setting up a known Authority, to which every one of that Society man appeal upon 
Injury received or controversies that  may arise, and which everyone  of the Society ought to 
obey; where-ever, any persons are, who have not such an Authority to appeal to, for the decision 
of any differences between them, there  those persons are still in the State of Nature”… and 





  Legitimate government calls for majority rule, rather than for unanimity.“ Infirmities of 
Health”  and  “Avocations of Business” are bound to  keep many members of a Civil Society 
from attending a public Assembly. Moreover, in any society there is a “variety of opinions and 
contrariety of interests” making unanimity well - nigh impossible. (ch. VIII § 98) 
 
 Every government, regardless of its form, should act in conformity with  “Laws of God 
and Nature”: first, the authorities should act in conformity with generally applicable promulgated 
laws. Secondly, the  laws ought to be designed for the good of the people. Third, the authorities 
may not raise taxes, except with the consent of the majority. Fourth, the legislature cannot 
transfer the law-making authority to any body not subject to majority control. 
 
 
By surrendering their freedom the governed give power over themselves to those who 












destroy the property of the people  or to reduce them to Slavery under Arbitrary Power” (chs. 
XIX.& 221 A  government which turns into a Leviathan is guilty of a breach of trust:.  “By this 
breach of Trust they [the government] forfeit the Power … and it devolves to the People, who 
have the Right to resume their original Liberty”(ch. XIX  § 222 and they are free  to establish a 
new government.   
 
 
David Hume  (1711 - 1776) and  the need for a framework regulating property relations 
 
Man is not motivated by “eminence”. On the contrary, 
 
”though it be rare to meet one who loves any person better than himself, yet it is as rare to meet 
one in whom all the kind affections, taken together, do not overbalance all the selfish” (Hume 




“[the] poetical fiction of the golden age is in some respects of a piece with the philosophical 
fiction of the state of nature; only that the former is represented at the most charming and most 
peaceable condition which can possibly be imagined, whereas the latter is painted out as a state 
of mutual war and violence attended with the most extreme necessity” (Hume 1751, 1948, p. 
189)7. 
                                                 
7  Hume  also took a gentler view of the government than :Hobbes: In every country ”the many 
are governed by the few”, hence “force is always on the side of the governed “ and therefore 
“governments have nothing to support them but opinion, where opinion means the “general 













 The  need for a Sovereign arises  not out of the struggle for “eminence” but out of man’s 
“insatiable, perpetual, universal and directly destructive of society avidity of acquiring goods and 
possessions for himself and for his relatives” (Hume 1739, 1948, p. 61)8. Despite such 
aggressively acquisitive tendencies, men  have  
 
“a general sense of common interest… which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain 
rules. I observe, that  it will be for my interest to leave another in possession of his goods, 
provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the 
regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed, and is 
known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may properly enough be 
called a convention or agreement betwixt us…”(Hume, 1739, 1948 p. 59). 
 
Reason dictates that men, in their self-interest submit themselves to common rules:  
 
 “[Men are]naturally induced to lay themselves under the restraint of such rules as may render 
their commerce more safe and commodious. (Hume, 1793,1948 p. 67).   “[I]t is impossible they 
                                                                                                                                                             
government which is established is equally advantageous with any other that could easily be 
settled”  (op. cit.. p. 313). It follows that though “A great sacrifice of liberty must necessarily be 
made in every government, yet the authority which confines liberty can never and perhaps ought 
never  in any constitution to become quite entire and uncontrollable.” (ibid. p. 307). History 
furnishes, unfortunately, many instances showing that Hume’ optimism was unwarranted. 
 
8 Conflicts regarding property may arise even among altruistic individuals. For consider the 
problem of division of a consumption good between two individuals, i and j, each of whom 
derives utility from his own consumption as well as from that of the other. An optimal allocation 
from i’s point of view may, nevertheless, apportion a larger share of the good to himself than 
would an optimal allocation from j’s point of view. A loving father may give a lower allowance 













should maintain a society of any kind without justice, and the observance of those three 
fundamental laws concerning the stability of possession, its translation by consent, and the 
performance of promises” (Hume, 1793, 1948 p. 103)  “To the imposition, then, and observance 
of these rules, both in general and in every particular instance, they are at first induced only by a 
regard of interest; and this motive, on the first formation of society, is sufficiently strong and 
forcible.” (Hume, 1793,1948 p. 67)  
 
 
 It may be possible for men “to maintain a small uncultivated society without government 
“(Hume, 1793,1948 p. 103). But when society has become numerous… this interest is more 
remote; nor do men so readily perceive that disorder and confusion follow upon every breach of 
these rules, as in a more narrow and contracted society.” (Hume, 1793,1948 p. 67) 
 
 Even men do not strive for “eminence” they may benefit through the imposition of 
common rules. Consider, again, Table 1.1: 
 
 
                                                                 Player j 
(1)  (2) 
(1)   ci11,  cj11  ci12, cj12  
Player i 
(2)    ci 21, cj21  ci22, cj 22  
 













Let strategy (1) represent the payoff in the absence of individual  expenditures on arms which 
could be used either defensively or aggressively, and  strategy (2)  the payoff when such 
expenditures are incurred, which means that cill < ci2l , cil2< ci22 , cj12 < cj1l  , cj2l < cj22 , and also  ci22 
< ci1l , cj22 < cj1l   In the absence of mutual trust, both will choose strategy 2. If the government 
provides security, both will strategy (1), and both will be better off. 
 
 The above result pertains in the absence of struggle for “eminence”   Indeed, a PD 
situation may arise even in the case of altruism. For let j stand for the average poor who number 
n and let i be one of the m rich. Write ci for i’s consumption and  Cj = ncj for the aggregate 
consumption of the poor. Individual i may be altruistic in the sense that  ui ((ci - t),( Cj +nt/m)) >  
ui (ci , Cj), but  ui ((ci - t),( Cj +t)) <  ui (ci , Cj), and also ui ((ci - t),( Cj +(n-1)t/m)) >  ui (ci , Cj). In 
words: i ‘s utility would increase if every rich (including himself) contributed t to the poor, but 
he would be worse off if he were the only contributor, and he would be best if all the rich (except 
himself) contributed to the poor.                                                             
  
  Hume’s major contention is that  economic efficiency is contingent upon the imposition 
and the maintenance of  “the rule for stability of possession”. History has validated his argument. 












institutional framework became ever more important.. Perhaps nothing shows as clearly the 
current relevance of Hume’s thought as the institutional problems facing the  so-called 
developing countries, and especially  by the countries in transition from the Soviet system. 
      
Sir William Petty (1623 - 1687) 
In his Treatise of Taxes and Contributions Sir William Petty lists seven “sorts of Publick 
charges”. The first is that of “defense by land and sea...  of peace at home and abroad”. The 
second, “The maintenance of Governors, Chief and Subordinate”. The third is that of “the 
Patronage of Mens  Souls” , that is, the maintenance of the clergy. The fourth, the administration 
of justice; the fifth, “the charge of schools and universities” The sixth – “that of the maintenance 
of orphans, found and exposed children and also of impotents of all sorts, and moreover of such 
as want employment” and “a last branch may be, the charge of high-ways, Navigable Rivers, 
Aqueducts, Bridges, Havens and other things of universal good and concernment”. This list 
contains only duties which, in Petty’s opinion, are “chief and most obvious of the rest…Other 
branches may be thought on, which let other men refer unto these, or add over and above.” 













 In contrast to his predecessors Petty lists social as well as economic reasons for 
government interference in the economy. The State should support orphans and of those 
incapable of work:  “For the permitting of any to beg is a more chargeable way to maintain 
them… besides it is unjust to let them starve”  (op. cit.  pp. 2 -3).  The State should finance the  
schools and universities to “Furnish all imaginable help unto the highest and finest Natural 
Wits... The which Wits should not be selected for that work, according to the fond conceits of 
their parents and friends... but rather by the approbation of others more impartial”9. The 
argument for the public support of the clergy shows Petty’s awareness of the close linkage 
between the social and the economic sphere: 
“One would think (because it respects another world, and the particular interest of each man 
there)”[that the State should not support the religious establishment, yet] “if we consider how 
easy it is to elude the law of man there follows a necessity of contributing toward a public 
charge, wherewith to have men instructed in the Laws of God, that take notice of evil thoughts 
and designs and much more of secret deeds, and punish them eternally in another world, that 
men can but slightly chastise in this” (ibid. p. 2)    
 
 Express the frequency of crime  as a function  FCR (YDIST, P, k, ж) where YDIST  stands for  
income distribution, , P for the probability of detection , k for the severity of punishment, and   ж  
for what we shall call propensity to commit crimes. To fight crime the government disposes of 
                                                 
9 . One could also argue that even with full knowledge, market allocation of educational 
facilities would not be efficient  because of financial market imperfections. Poor people, lacking 













two instruments: it may  raise P, by devoting  resources to “Law and Order”, or it may reduce  ж  
by inculcating in the population principles of morality10.  
 
 Whether the i’th member of society decides  to devote his time to  
income generation or to illegal appropriation of income  depends on whether: 
 u(w)  ≥ or < Pu(жq) + (1-P)u(k) 
Or, assuming risk neutrality:   
 w  ≥ or < P(жq) + (1-P)k 
An absolutely moral individual (for whom ж = 0) will never do anything illegal. A pure hedonist 
(for whom ж = 1) does not care whether the money comes through legal or through illegal means 
so he will do whatever has the higher payoff. A marginal increase in expenditure on “Law and 
Order” deceases the payoff of illegal activities by  (жq – k)•∂P/∂g, while a marginal increase in 
expenditure on moral instruction cuts it down by Pq•∂ж/∂g . Notice that the effect of expenditure 
on “Law and Order” is the greater, the less “moral” the population, whereas the effect of 
expenditure on morality is the greater, the more lax is the enforcement of law. 
  
                                                 
10   Other things being equal, the frequency of criminal behavior is likely to be an increasing function of income 
dispersion. It is, however, difficult to imagine a society which adopts income equalization measures in order to 
reduce the crime rate. Crimes are deterred by punishment; we assume here that k  represents the most severe 












 Petty’s treatment of the positive economics of the State is very rudimentary. Much like 
Hobbes’s Leviathan, Petty’s Sovereign is guided by enlightened self-interest which dictates 
restraint. The Sovereign may “ask for more than he needs”. But  
“if the sovereign were sure to have what he wanted in due time, it were his own great damage to 
draw money away out of his subjects’ hands, who by trade increase it, and to hoard it up in his 
own coffers, where it is of no use even to himself, but liable to be begged away or vainly 




James Steuart - Denham (1712 - 1780) 
In  An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy Sir James Steuart-Denham, a 
near-contemporary of Adam Smith, seeks to define the pre-conditions of a “free society” whose 
members could enjoy the fruits of the division of labor. “The best way of binding a free society 
together is by multiplying reciprocal obligations, and creating a general dependence between all 
its members” (Steuart 1767, 1966 vol. I p. 207)11   For this purpose the State should  promulgate 
and enforce of laws defining mutual relations. A possible interpretation of this is that, in 
Stewart’s opinion, a system of mutual obligations cements society and mitigates conflicts among 
interest groups.  
 
                                                 













Steuart’s approach is strictly normative. The objective of  the Inquiry  “is to examine the 
consequences of what we feel and see daily passing, and to point out how the bad may be 
avoided and the good turned to best advantage” (ibid. vol. I p.76). A good government should 
not only preserve Law and Order. It should also come to the aid of those who, through no fault of 
their own, fall victim of economic evolution: 
“In treating every question of political economy, I constantly  suppose a statesman at the head of 
government, systematically conducting every part of it, so as to prevent the vicissitudes  of 
manners , and innovations, by their natural effects from hurting any interest in the 
commonwealth...   if a number of machines are all at once introduced in the manufactures of an 
industrial nation... it becomes the business of the statesman  to interest himself so far in the 
consequences, as to provide a remedy for the inconveniences resulting from the sudden 
alteration” (ibid.  vol. I p. 122) 
 
 An economic shock, such as the introduction of a new technology, or the abolition of 
 trade barriers, may  raise the living standards of certain sectors of  society, and lower the living 
standards of others. Steuart advances a purely humanitarian reason for the compensation of those 
who, through no fault of their own, suffer a loss of physical or of human capital. One may also 
argue for compensation on purely pragmatic grounds: unless compensation is paid, the losing 
group may block the change, to the detriment off society as a whole. The blocking tactics are all 
too familiar to those who have followed the uncertain path of de-communization of the countries 














Adam Smith (1723 -1790) 
 Prior to Adam Smith  the political economists  considered how to restrain human 
passions to make man fit to live peacefully in society (Hume, op. cit. pp. 61-62). Smith  is the 
first to show that the pursuit of  “passions” results in a common good:   
 “[i]n civilized society...[man] stands at all times in need of the cooperation and assistance of 
great multitudes... and it is in vain for him to expect it  from their benevolence only.  He will be 
more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favor, and show that it is for their 
own advantage to do for him what he requires of them” (Smith, 1776, 1976, Book I, ch. ii,vol. I 
p. 18) 
 
Therefore the Sovereign: 
"has only three duties to attend to, three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and 
intelligible to common understanding: first, the duty of protecting the society from  the violence 
and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible,  
every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the 
duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of erecting and 
maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the 
interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much 
more than repay it to a great society" (ibid. Book iv, ch. ix,  vol. II pp. 208-209) 
 
 The State has to possess  the contract-enforcing authority because 
“Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a 
regular administration of justice, in which people do not feel secure in the possession of their 
property, in which faith in contracts is not supported by law, and the  authority of state is not 
supposed to be regularly employed  in enforcing the payment of debts” (ibid. Book V, ch. iii, vol. 













 The need for authority arises out of  economic inequality: 
"Envy, malice or resentment, are the only passions which can prompt one man to injure another 
in his person or reputation. But the greater part of men are not frequently under the influence of 
those passions... Men may live together in society  with some tolerable degree of security, 
though there is no  civil magistrate to protect them from the injustice of those passions" (ibid. 
Bk. V, ch. I, pt.ii, vol. II, pp. 231 - 232) 
 
 
  The three “duties of the sovereign”  reflect the collective interests of the entire polity. 
But the interests of the rich clash with those of the poor. Anticipating Marx, Smith maintains that 
the government is run mainly in the interest of the former: 
"The affluence of the rich  excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by 
want, and prompted by envy, to invade his possessions. It is only  under the shelter of the 
magistrate that the owner of that valuable property... can sleep a single night with security" (Ibid.  
Bk. V, ch. I pt.ii, vol.  II, p. 233) 
 
and therefore:  
 
“The rich, in particular, are necessarily interested to support that order of things, which can alone 
secure them in the possession of their own advantages... Civil government, so far as it is 
instituted  for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against 
the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all” (Ibid. Book. V, 




“Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between masters and their 
workmen, is counselors are always the masters. When the regulation, therefore, is in favour of   
the workmen, it is always  just and equitable, but it is sometimes otherwise when in favour of the 













Smith was far, however, from being a proto-Marxian. In contrast to  Steuart, who sought 
compensation for workers – victims of otherwise beneficial economic change – Smith was 
concerned lest the large-scale capitalists be hurt by  the reforms which he favored. Thus, the  
trade barriers, which he opposed, should not be abolished all at once, lest the import-substituting 
industries suffer losses:  
 
“The undertaker of a great manufacture who, by the home markets being suddenly laid open to 
competition of foreigners, should be obliged to abandon his trade, would no doubt suffer very 
considerably…. [T]hat part of it [i.e. of his capital]which was fixed in workhouses, and in 
instruments of trade, could scarce be disposed of without considerable loss. The equitable regard, 
therefore, to his interests requires that changes of this kind should never be introduced suddenly, 
but slowly, gradually, and after a very long warning” (Ibid. Bk. IV, Ch. II, vol. II p. 494) 
 
 In fact, government policies are molded under the influence of  special interest groups 12. 
“The law of England… favors agriculture not only indirectly by the protection of commerce, but 
by several direct encouragements. Except in times of scarcity, the exportation of corn is… 
encouraged by a bounty. In times of moderate plenty, the importation of foreign corn is loaded 
with duties that amount to a prohibition. These encouragements… demonstrate at least the good 
intentions of the legislature to favour agriculture”  (Book III ch. iv vol. Ii   p.443, 
 
Individual industries, such as woolen manufacturing also receive protection from foreign 
competition at the expense of the polity as a whole (Book IV ch.ii, vol. Ii, p. 474. 
 
 Those who govern also constitute an  interest group. Governments are rapacious:   
 
 “The violence and injustice of the rulers of mankind is an ancient evil, for which... the nature of 
human affairs can scarce admit a remedy” are they are venal: “[T]here is no art that one 
                                                 












government sooner learns from another than that of draining money from the pockets of the 
people” (ibid. Bk. V, ch.ii, pt.ii, Vol. ii p. 390). 
 




“The proud minister of an ostentatious court may frequently take pleasure in  executing a 
work of splendour and magnificence... But to execute a great number of little works, in which 
nothing that can be done can make any great appearance, or excite the smallest degree of 
admiration, and which, in short, have nothing to recommend them but their extreme utility, is a 
business which appears in every respect too mean and paultry to merit the attention of so great a 
minister”. (Ibid. Bk.V, ch. i, pt.iii, Art.i, Vol ii p. 251)    
 
 
 Indeed, Smith sometimes doubts whether governments are capable of fulfilling some of  
their “three great duties”. He opposes the proposal that the government should manage the 
English turnpikes and make a revenue from them, because there would be temptation to raise the 
level of duties, and to neglect the roads: “A large revenue might thus be levied upon the people, 
without any part of it being  applied to the only purpose to which a revenue levied in this manner 
ought ever to be applied” (Ibid. Bk.V, ch. i, pt.iii, Art.i, vol. II p. 250)    
 
 Though the government is far from being an impartial; body working for the Common 
Good,    
 “The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself 
with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle that it is alone, and without any assistance, 












impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too often encumbers its operations” 






For Madison the central duty of the government is to find solutions acceptable to the 
various “fractions” of society. The division of  society into “fractions”  follows from the very 
nature of man: 
 “As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different 
opinions will be formed .. The latent causes of fraction are thus  sown in the nature of men… A 
zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points , 
as well of speculation as of practice… divided men into parties, inflamed them with mutual 
animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-
                                                 
13  Smith’s attitude toward the relations between the State and the Economy are subject to a 
diversity of interpretations. Joseph Copsey (1957) holds that, according to Smith, commerce 
generates freedom and , at the same time, free institutions are indispensable to the preservation 
of commerce.- a view for which Duncan    Forbes (in Skinner and Wilson,  1976) finds no 
support. According to  Hirschman   Smith  thinks that as long as the government is “good 
enough“ the invisible hand will prevail: ”It appears that Smith advocates less a state with 
minimal functions than one whose capacity for folly would have some ceiling“ (Hirschman, 
1977 p. 104) .  Stigler chides Smith for failing to develop a full-fledged positive theory of 
government. According to   Stigler  in Smith’s works ”little attention is paid to the political 
process, and that little is tantalizingly diverse.  In some respects the sovereign is an incompetent 
manager. In general, however, Smith’s attitude toward political  behavior was that of a parent 
toward a child: the child was often mistaken and sometimes perverse, but normally it would  













operate for their common good”, but “the most common and durable source of factions has been 
the various and unequal distribution of property.” 14 
 
Here Madison echoes  Hume who also drew a distinction between “personal” factions, reflecting 
individual loyalties and dislikes, and “real” factions “founded on some real difference of 
sentiment or interest”( Essay VIII: Of Parties in General ( in Hume, 1963 p.55)) The real 
factions may be further subdivided “into those from interest from principle and from affection”  
The factions from interest  “are the most reasonable and the most excusable… [because] [t]he 
distinct orders of men, nobles and people, soldiers and merchants, have all a distinct 
interest”.(ibid. p.58) 
  Hume, considers, however, that all factions, even those which are “the most reasonable 
and the most excusable” are an evil that ought to be wiped out. A government dominated by 
fractions will not act in the Common Good:   
 
“Where two orders of man, such as the nobles and people, have a distinct  authority in a 
government, not very accurately balanced and modeled,  they naturally follow  a distinct interest; 
nor  can we reasonably expect a different conduct , considering that degree of  selfishness 
implanted in human nature”(ibid. p.58)  
 
and therefore, 
                                                 












“As  much as legislators and founders of states ought to be honoured and  respected among men, 
as much ought the founders of sects and fractions be detested and hated; because … Factions 
subvert government,  render laws impotent,  and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the 
same nation, who ought to give mutual assistance to each other.”(ibid. p. 55) 
 
By contrast, for Madison factions are a natural outgrowth of liberty: “No free Country 
has ever been without parties which are a natural offspring of freedom.” 15 The suppression of 
the former is tantamount to the suppression of the latter: 
 “Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an ailment without which it instantly expires. But 
it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes 
faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because 
it imparts to fire its destructive agency”16  
 
Rather than suppressing factions, governments should seek to find compromise solutions: 
“Those who hold and those who are without property have ever  formed distinct interests in 
society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall  under a  like discrimination.  A 
landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, withy many 
lesser  interests, grow  up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into classes, actuated  
by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering  interests 
forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction  in the 
necessary and ordinary operations of the government”17 
 
The Madisonian government should act as an arbiter between the interest groups and as a 
representative of the interests of society as a whole:  
                                                 














“The great desideratum in Government is such a modification in sovereignty as will render it 
sufficiently neutral  between the different interests and factions, to control one part of the society 
from invading  the rights of another, and at the same time sufficiently controlled itself,  from 
setting up an interest adverse to that of  the whole Society”18   
 
The rights of the minority must be protected, for  “it would be in the interest of the majority in 
every community to despoil and enslave the minority of  individuals”19 In particular, the system 
of checks and balances “ought to be so constituted  as to protect the minority of  the opulent 
against the majority”.20 The poor should, however, be protected against the rich, for “”there are 
various ways in which the rich may oppress the poor”21  
 
 What motivates the government? On this issue Madison was silent. The completion of  a  
model of a democratic government was not accomplished until the development of neo classical 
political economy 
 
Karl Marx (1818-83) and Friedrich Engels (1820-95) 
 
  Marx and Engels consider  the evolution of the state in function of the changing  
property relations.  “In primitive times, the whole public authority  in time of peace was 
exclusively judicial, and rested on the popular authority of the hundred, the shire, or of the whole 
tribe”22  With the increase in the degree of inequality “Society divides into classes; the privileged 
                                                 
18 James Madison,  “Observations” April 1787 reprinted in Madison (1953) p. 29 
19 James Madison,  letter to James Monroe,  October 5, 1786, reprinted in Madison (1953) p. 45 
20 James Madison, in Federal Convention, 1787, reprinted in Madison (1953) p. 45 
21 James Madison, Note to  Speech on the Right of Suffrage” ca. 1821, reprinted in Madison (1953) p. 37 
 












and the dispossessed, the exploiters and the exploited, the rulers and the ruled; and the State… 
from this stage onwards… acquires… the function of maintaining by force the conditions of 
existence and domination  of the ruling class against the subject class”23 . 
 
The State is not, however, a mere instrument of oppression: “society gives rise to certain 
functions which it cannot dispense with”  which the State fulfills.24  But neither Marx nor Engels 
devote much attention to the “duties of the sovereign”. Indeed, “Classical Marxism  contained  
only a  very  incomplete theorization of politics, and of the institution of the state” (Shaw, 1985, 
p. 246) Moreover, 
 though he role o f the class concept in Marxism is ”immense”…“…it is astonishing not 
to find a definition of this concept… anywhere in the works of either Marx or Engels. … The 
term ‘class’ has for them a variable denotation: that is, it refers to groups differentiated  in 
various ways within a more inclusive category, such as  the category of groups  with common 
economic interests, or the category of groups whose members share economic conditions that are 
identical in a certain respect. The sharing of permanent  economic interests is a particularly 
important  characteristic of classes in Marxian doctrine, and for this reason it has been easy to 
overlook the fact that although it is in the Marxian view , a necessary condition it does not 
constitute a sufficient condition for a valid definition of a social class” (Osowski, 1963, p. 71) 
  
 
The roster of  classes in a particular society is determined by the mode of  production. 
However,  
                                                                                                                                                             
Draper, (1977)  p. 243 
23 F. Engels, Anti-Duhrig Herr Eugen Duhrig’s Revolution in Science 2nd ed.  Moscow: Foreign Languages  
Publishing House, 1959, p. 205, quoted in Draper (1977) p. 245 













“There is no rule-of –thumb definition which decides whether the chief of an armed band who 
resides in a stronghold and lives off the surplus labor of unfree producers, etc. is or is not a 
member of a feudal class. The point can be settled…  only by a concrete examination of the 
overall social relations of the society. Similarly,  merchants become a separate class not simply 
because they buy and sell, but only when their buying and selling begins to play a certain role in 
a given society”  (Draper, 1977, p. 507) 
 
In advanced capitalism the basic dichotomy between the oppressors and the oppressed  
“crystallized into a division of society into a small, excessively rich class, and a large, 
propertyless class of wage workers”25  The  property  owners do not constitute, however,  a 
homogenous group. In  Das Kapital,  Marx draws a distinction between the owners of labor 
power, the owners of capital, and the owners of land.26; elsewhere he recognizes even smaller 
sub-groups.27 At times, the interest groups cooperate with each other: Marx speaks, for instance 
of  “the permanent  alliance between  the [English] bourgeoisie and the greater part of the big 
landlords”28 But the diversity of interests gives rise to conflicts: as is the case of France where 
there is a conflict of interests between the bourgeoisie, and the “Financiers [who] seek to enrich 
themselves no through production but through appropriation”29 , while  the struggle between the 
                                                 
25 F. Engels, Introduction to  Marx’s Wage Labor and Capital, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works 
in Two Volumes.  Moscow:  Foreign  Language Publishing House, 1951, vol. I p. 73 
26 Karl Marx, Capital vol. III Moscow:  Foreign  Language Publishing House, 1959, p. 862 
27 According to Osowski , in his division of society into classes  Marx  applies two different criteria:: one is 
ownership or means of production or lack thereof, and the second is employment status . Thus the self-employed 
petty bourgeoisie constitutes a distinct class from capitalists and from hired labor.(Osowski, 1963, pp. 75-76) 
28 Karl Marx “Review of Guizot” Articles on Britain Moscow  1972, p. 93 quoted in  Maguire (1978)  p. 173 












Orleanists and the Legitimists can be seen in terms of a competition between the owners of 
capital and the landlords30 
 
Government officials exploit the conflicts among  the various possessing . They form a 
new branch of division of labor within society. This gives them particular interests, distinct, too, 
from the interests of those who empower them; they make themselves independent of the 
latter.”31 As a consequence, as pointed out by Theda Sockpol “fundamental conflicts of interest 
might exist between the dominant class or  set of groups on the one hand, and the state rulers on 
the other”32    
 
 Ideologically, Marx and Engels   stand on the opposite pole from Adam Smith; the  
Marxian method of approach to Political Economy also differs markedly from that of the 
Classics. Yet, except for differences in emphasis, the two traditions have a very similar  
conception of the economic role of the State. Both traditions recognize that  the State  supplies 
socially useful goods and services  which  the  market fails to provide. Adam Smith sees that the  
government is of major importance  to the possessing classes   whose interests it presumably 
                                                 
30 Karl Marx The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte ibid. vol. I pp. 247-253 
31 F. Engels, letter to C. Schmidt, 27 October 1890 in Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence (2nd ed. 1965) p. 
421, quoted in  Draper (1977) p. 246. 












serves, while Marx and Engels perceive  the government as a tool which the possessing classes 
utilize to exploit  the dispossessed. But  Marx and Engels, no less than the Classics, recognize 
that among the possessing classes there is heterogeneity of interests which  By acting as arbiter, 
or by allying itself with some interests against others the government gains autonomy. The 
government is not a mere tool: it is a major player the politico-economic game. 
 
John Stewart Mill (1806 - 1873) 
Mill’s Principles of Political Economy  are the apogee of the classical political economy. 
Like his predecessors Mill endeavored to treat the entire socio-politico-economic Gestalt. Thus 
in the preface to the second edition of his Principles we read that: 
“Except on matters of mere detail, there are perhaps no practical questions, even among 
those which approach nearest to the character of purely economical questions, which admit on 
being decided on economical premises alone” (Mill 1909, 1968,  pp. xxvii - xxviii)33  
 
Mill draws a  clear  line between  “economic laws” and social objectives 
“The laws and conditions of the production of wealth partake of the character of physical 
truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them”. But “it is not so with the distribution of 
wealth. That is a matter of human institutions solely... The distribution of wealth... depends on 
the laws and customs of society” (Ibid. pp. 199 -200)  
 
                                                 













 Neoclassical analysis  accepts, as a matter of convenience, Mill’s distinction between 
economic laws and social goals. The two types of  problems, in truth, are not separable. As noted 
by Adam Smith, the greater the inequality of possessions, the greater the need for “Law and 
Order”. It is, indeed, difficult to think of a public good  the demand for which is independent 
from  income distribution, though Mill was clearly right in  drawing a distinction between 
narrowly defined economic efficiency and  social equity.  
 
 Corresponding to the dual nature of economics, the political economist has two distinct 
tasks:  to discover and to analyze the “physical truths” and to prescribe policies favoring the 
establishment of a good society. In contrast to earlier ”classics” Mill tends to discount the effects 
of pressure groups on policies. Thus, in his discussion of protectionist policies Mill demonstrates 
that the imposition of trade restrictions create a deadweight loss, but he fails to acknowledge that 
trade barriers are advantageous to import-competing  industries. On the contrary, he argues that 
“Those who are supposed to be benefited, namely the makers of the protected articles (unless 
they form an exclusive company, and have a monopoly against their won countrymen as well as 
against foreigners) do not obtain profits higher than other people”. (ibid. p. 917). Protectionism, 
he continues was “originally grounded on what is called the Mercantile System... The principle 












restrictive system” Unlike Adam Smith, Mill does not perceive that interest groups pressure 
governments to pursue policies that may be inimical to  the common good. Such policies, in 
Mill’s opinion, reflect  the policy makers’ imperfect understanding of “physical truths. The  
economist’s duty is to enlighten the policy maker and enable him to carry out his duties so as tp 
promote the common good. 
 
 Some government functions, for example rules providing for standards of weights 
and measures, are “inseparable from the idea of a government, or are exercised habitually and  
without objection by all governments”. But when it comes to other rules, such as those 
determining maximum or minimum prices “it has been considered questionable whether 
governments should exercise them or not” (ibid. p. 796)  Mill thinks, therefore, that the 
compilation of a list of Duties of the Sovereign is a futile task.  Instead on page 950 of his 
Principles, he proposes a pragmatic  rule which many find to be valid to this day: “Laissez-faire 
… should be the general practice: every departure from it unless required by some general good, 
is a certain evil”. To be sure not all private institutions function efficiently: 
“Government management is, indeed, proverbially jobbing, careless, and ineffective, but so 
likewise has been joint-stock management. The directors of a joint stock company, it is true, are 
always shareholders; but also members of the government are invariably taxpayers; and in the 
case of directors, no more than in the case of governors, is their proportional share of the benefits 
of good management equal to the interest  they may possibly have in mismanagement, even 













Nevertheless, since the government is less efficient than the “invisible hand” government should 
step in only where it  is demonstrably able to outperform the private sector. 
 
 The pragmatic rule advocated by Mill is of major importance. For consider, again, the 
example of the “game” (shown in figs. 1.2 and 1.3) where the market leads to a Pareto-inferior 
position. State interference could improve all the players’ welfare, provided the cost of 
interference were less than 16. If the cost were to be higher, it would be better not to interfere. 
Thus “market failure” does not constitute a sufficient reason for State interference. The State 
should step in only if the benefit from its action exceeds the cost.  
  
Lessons from the “Classics” 
 We owe to Hobbes the basic notion that a selfish citizenry derives benefits from the 
subordination to a selfish ruler who imposes “Law and Order” to foster his own good. Locke, by 
contrast, looks upon the State as a voluntary association of equals who surrender a degree of 
freedom for the sake of the Common Good. Hume sees the need for an authority to regulate 
property rights. Petty draws attention to the need of State action to achieve economic efficiency 












granted that even a selfish  government is capable of providing an institutional framework 
permitting people to strive for individual betterment, such strivings fostering a common good. 
Madison develops the ideas of the “Agency Government” whose purpose to keep a balance 
among conflicting interests, while Marx looks upon the government as a tool to foster the 
interests of the economically powerful. Such ideas – including JS Mill’s pragmatic advice to 
leave all activities to the private sector, unless the government is capable of doing a better job- 
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